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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

GERTRUDE GIBBS, LYNN P.
GIBBS and GAYE GIBBS SMITH,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Civil No. 7710

-vs.BLUE CAB, INC., a corporation,
Defend(JJYI,t and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although the Statement of Facts in appellants'
brief is, in general, accur,ate, we believe it is insufficient
in detail to enable the Court to understand fully the
circumstances surrounding the accident out of which
this case arose. Therefore, we have prepared our own
·statement of facts.

3
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The intersection where the accident occurred is
located in a residential area in the city of Ogden. 23rd
Street is a through street running east and west and

at

ill

is fully paved with a black top surface (Tr. 29). It is
55 feet wide from curb to curb, as is Jefferson Avenue,
which intersects it at a right angle (stipulated diagram).
West of the intersection, 23rd Street has a slight down-

1[1

ward slope, but the slope is so slight that it is still pos-

tal

sible to stand in the center of the Jefferson Avenue inter-

IT

section and see the shoes of a man standing at the inter-

113

section of 23rd ;Street and Adams Avenue, which is
one city block to the west (Tr. 87). A person approaching 23rd Street on Jefferson Avenue from the north
is required to stop at the stop sign which is near the
north curb line of 23rd Street. Either at that point
or at a point ten steps to the north, such a person can see
to the west as far as Adams A venue, or a distance of
one block, without difficulty (Tr. 87). The trees which
are shown in the stipulated diagram on the north side
of 23rd Street between the curb and the sidewalk are
either so small or so widely spaced that visibility of a
person on Jefferson A venue approaching the intersection is not impaired 'by them (Exhibits C and D),
and particularly, the headlights of an approaching car
on 23rd Street would be clearly visible· (Tr. 87). The
intersection is lighted by an ordinary street light in
the northeast corner, but there is no other illumination
on the intersection.
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The accident happened on November 24, 1948, at
about 6 :40 A.~I., which was about 45 minutes before
sunrise (Tr. 68). The respondent's agent, Ronald D.
:Jiullen, was driving respondent's taxicab easterly on
23rd Street en route to pick up a passenger at a point
east of Jefferson Avenue, and was driving at a speed
of 20 to 25 miles per hour. It was dark, the street was
wet, and it was raining. The windshield wipers of the
cab were operating, and the headlights were on bright
(Tr. 55). The butterfly window on the driver's side
was open (Tr. 64) to allow air to enter the cab to prevent fogging. No other automobile traffic was on the
road. As Mullen reached the intersection, he "was observing the full view out of'' his windshield, and his
headlights diffused out at an angle, so that he could
observe things on either side of the ·cab (Tr. 61). The
first and only thing he ·saw was the front wheel of a
bicycle in the diffused angle of t~e left front headlight. He never saw the man on the bicycle prior to
I

impact. Although the Ogden City ordinance in effect
at the time required it (Tr. 74), the bicycle had no
light on it (Tr. 57).
Mullen cramped the wheel of the cab to the righ~,
so that he was going in a southeasterly direction (Tr.
62), and the bicycle wheel was turned so that it was
going in a south by southeast direction. The cab struck
the. bicycle a glancing blow on the front mud guard
(Tr. 55-58). Mullen stopped the cab quickly, and says·
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that he did so within 10 to 15 feet (Tr. 55), although
the position of the cab as indicated on the stipulated
diagran1 is at the southeast corner of the intersection
at the -curb. Mullen got out of the cab and for the
first time saw the man, F. Parley Gibbs, who had apparently been riding the bicycle (Tr. 55). Gibbs, the
deceased, picked up the bicycle with Mullen's assistance,
and they carried it to the front of the cab where the
bicycle was inspected for damage in the light from
the cab's headlights. The deceased insisted that he was
"all right" and said that the bicycle was "damaged
a little bit" (Tr. 55). Apparently no further conversation was had between Mullen and the deceased. At
least, Mullen did not testify to any further conversation, nor did the witness, Tyler (Tr. 50), who appeared
on the scene just as he heard a voice say, "I am all
right.''
The deceased pushed or carried his bicycle to the
north, back up Jefferson A venue where he lived, and
1\:fullen continued on his way for a half a block where
he picked up his fare, the witness 0 'Neill.
Although there is no evidence on this point, it has
been assumed by both sides to the case that the deceased,
after placing his bicycle against the side of his house,
walked or ran from that point south to 24th Street, a
distance of one and one-third blocks, and then turned
west to Washington Boulevard, a distance of two blocks,
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where he got a bus on the corner of Washington Boulevard and ~4th Street (Tr. 23). The deceased sat in his
seat in such a position as to giYe the appearance of
being ill, and ~ubsequent examination revealed that he
had died.
In the n1eantime, ~Iullen, after delivering his passenger to his destination, realized he had forgotten to
obtain the name of the n1an on the bicycle, and that he
would need to know the nan1e to make his accident
report. He then drove back to the area of the accident
and noti~ed a bicycle leaning against the house, ·but,
inasmuch as the hour was early and there were no
lights on in the house, he decided to return to the house.
later in the day to obtain the information (Tr. 58).
When he did so, he discovered that the deceased had
passed away as indicated.
Thereafter this action was instituted by the heirs
of the deceased against the cab company and Mullen.
However, Mullen was never served vYith summons, and
the action proceeded to trial as against the cab company
only. Trial was had on appellants' second amended
complaint and respondent's answer. The complaint
alleged negligence in general terms, and the answer
pleaded a defense of contributory negligence in general
terms with the specific allegation that the deceased had
violated the Ogden ordinance by f1ailure to have a light,
lamp or lantern connected to his bicycle. Upon trial,
it developed that there were no eye witnesses to the
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accident, except the witness Mullen, and so the evidence in the record concerning the details of the accident
comes from Mullen and from the inferences drawn
from the physical evidence available.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court
granted a motion by respondent for a directed verdict.
The trial court, at the request of appellants, made an
inspection of the accident scene and reported his findings beginning at (Tr. 87). His decision was announced
as being based upon the fact that the deceased had
an opportunity to see, and could have seen, for an entire block as the car approached, and that his failure
to see was negligence, which would concur with negligence of the automobile driver (Tr. 87, 88). Appellants have appealed from the judgment entered upon
the directed verdict ( T. 018).
After the notice of appeal was served and filed,
counsel for both sides joined in the preparation of the
stipulated diagram, which has been made a part of
this record. The diagram was prepared in an effort
to assist the Court in visualizing the accident scene,
and to overcome some of the confusion which exists in
the record because of the fact that the case was tried
with the use of a blackboard to which witnesses referred, but which renders their testimony meaningless
unless the blackboard is available for examination. The
diagram was prepared from notes of counsel, and appears to be accurate except that the stop sign protectSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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9
ing 23rd Street fron1 traffic from the north is shown
on the diagram to have been north of the sidewalk,
whereas the photog·raphs (Exhibits C and D) reveal
that it was located between the sidewalk and the curb
line, thus making the stop sign closer to 23rd Street
than it is indicated on the diagram.
STATE.MENTS OF POINTS
L THE PRESUMPTION THAT DECEDENT ACTED
WITH DUE CARE CANNOT STAND WHERE THE EVIDENCE, AND THE INFERENCES DRAWN THEREFROM,
SHOW THAT DUE CARE WAS NOT EXERCISED.
II. THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, THAT F. PARLEY GIBBS, THE DECEASED, WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO HIS DEATH.
Ill. THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD
BE AFFIRMED, EVEN IF THE GROUNDS ASSIGNED BY
THE TRIAL COURT ARE INADEQUATE, WHERE, AS
HERE, IT APPEARS FROM THE ENTIRE RECORD THAT
A VERDICT FOR THE DEFENDANT WOULD HAVE BEEN
REQUIRED IN ANY EVENT.
AR~UMENT

L THE PRESUMPTION THAT DECEDENT ACTED
WITH DUE CARE CANNOT STAND WHERE THE EVIDENCE, AND THE INFERENCES DRAWN THEREFROM,
SHOW THAT DUE CARE WAS NOT EXERCISED.

The respondent agrees that there is 'a recognized
principle of law to the effect that deceased is presumed
to have exercised due care for his own safety. But, it
is ou~ position that this presumption has no application
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where there is evidence from which it can be determined
how the accident happened and where circumstances
exist which point inescapably to the conclusion that
due care could not have been exercised. As we shall
point out, this accident would not have happened had
due care been exercised by the decedent, and therefore,
his lack of due care will be shown to have been one of
the concurring causes of the accident, if not the sole
proximate cause.
First, let it be clear that we do not agree with the
statement of fact in appellants' brief to the effect that
there is no evidence in the record as to whether decedent
was riding his bicycle, pushing it, or merely standing
in the intersection. Any ·claim by appellants that the
decedent was not riding his bicycle is pure afterthought,
since their entire case was presented to the lower court
on the basis that the decedent was riding his bicycle.
No mention is made of this subject in appellants' complaint, or first amended complaint, but in their second
amended complaint, in paragraph 3, appears the allegation that decedent was crossing the street "upon his
bicycle" (emphasis added). Further, in plaintiffs'
opening statement to the jury (Tr. 2), it was asserted
that plaintiffs would show that decedent "left home
on his bicycle to report for work."
While it may be said that these are mere assertions,
it is logical to suppose that the bicycle was used to ride
to work, as it apparently had been in the past. Further,
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this theory finds support in the t>Yidence in a particular
apparently overlooked by appellants: as detailed in
our staten1ent of facts, the front wheel of the bicycle
was first seen within the edge of the bean1 of light cast
by the cab ~s left front headlight. The cab was immediately swerved so that its course was changed by 40°
to the southeast. If the ·bicycle had been standing still,
or moving at a ''walking" rate of speed of 3 or 4 miles
per hour, the cab would not have struck the bicycle,
because the path of the cab, after the swerve, would
have been to the south of the bicycle. The bicy~e had
to be moving at a "riding" speed of 10 to 15 miles per
hour in order to move from the north or left side of
the path of travel of the cab into the area of impact
after the swerve of the cab. The logical inference to
be drawn from these physical facts, and from the fact
that a man on the way to work on a downhill street,
would be riding, not

pu~hing

the bicycle or standing

still with it, is that the decedent was riding his bicycle
at the time of the collision. Further evidence leading
irresistibly to this conClusion is found in the fact that
while the impact on the bicycle was at the front mud
guard, the large bicycle seat was ''practically torn off''
(Tr. 77), indicating that the seat was bearing weight
at the time of impact on the front of the bicycle.
Thus, there is evidence from which can ·be gleaned
a course of conduct by the deceased prior to impact.
This evidence, when coupled with the evidence of the
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respondent's driver, and applied to the physical facts
relating to the intersection, ~provides ample proof of
what happened. In such circumstances, the presumption of due care by the deceased collapses. As was said
by this Court in Perrin v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 59
Utah 1, the presumption "is applicable only in the
absence of evidence as to just how the accident happened.
There was no eye witness. It is only in such cases
that litigants are entitled to an instruction" on the
presumption.
An examination of the cases cited by appellants
In support of their claim of this presumption reveals
that the presumption is allowed in cases where there
is no evidence of any kind as to what happened. Typical
are the cases of Lewis v. Western Ry. Co., 40 Utah 483,

:11

123 P. 97, (where the dismembered body of the deceased
was found strewn by the defendant's track, and no one
saw the accident); Davis v.

D.~

R. G. W. R. R. Co., 45
Utah 1, 142 P. 705, (where a witness saw decedent walk
toward the railroad track, but didnt see what happened
until after impact, and therefore, could not say if
decedent looked up the track or, if he had looked,
whether he could have seen the train); Barke.r v. Savas,
52 Utah 262, 172 P. 672, (where the body of a six year
old boy was found near his tricycle at the side of the
road. However, there was affirmative evidence that
decedent was not negligent, but was riding his tricycle
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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where he should have been. There were no eye witnesses to the accident, and there were admissions from
the defendant driver to be considered by the court).
In those cases eited by appellants in which the
presumption is discussed, but discarded as inapplicable to the facts of the case, there are many statements
of abstract principles of la\Y approving the presumption. .Among these cases are Mingus v. Olsson, (Utah,
191=9), 201 P. (2d) 495, and Compton v. Ogden Union Ry.
& Depot Co., (Utah, 1951), 235 P. (2d) 515, in each of
which the Court stated that the presumption could not
apply because of the existence of evidence as to the
conduct of the decedent prior to the impact. From
these statements, it is clear that the principle announced in the Perrin case, supra, is still the law in
this state, and the presumption is not indulged except
in the absence of evidence as to how the ,accident happened. The question of whether or not the presumption
of due care should apply is 'a question to be decided
upon the facts of each case.
The presumption discussed herein is not as broad
as is indicated by some of the excerpts from cases
quoted in appellants' brief. For example, appellants
quote verbatim a jury instruction from the ease of Davis

v. R. R. Co., supra, which they claim this Court held
"proper." The instruction stated that the presumption
was that the deceased ''looked and listened'' for the
train. The Supreme Court stated, at pages 9 and 10 of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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45 Utah, that this instruction came from an earlier case
and that just because it was approved once does not
mean it should be used as a model. The instruction
was faulty, the Court said, as being argumentative when
it stated that the deceased was presumed to have "looked
and listened.'' This is so, said the Court, because while
"the court may inform the jury that, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, a person exposed to danger
is presumed to have exercised due care for his safety,"
yet ''there is no presumption that he did a particular
thing."
One of the more recent expressions on this question
by the Utah Supreme Court is found in the case of
Gren v. Norton, (1949), 213 P. (2d) 356. In that case,
the deceased drove his vehicle into the path of the defendant's truck, which was coming from the deceased's
right on a through highway. It was undisputed that
the deceased had an opportunity for an unobstructed
view of the road to his right for several hundred feet,
and while some witnesses gave testimony indicating that
the deceased had not looked in that direction until juf:'t
before impact, there was other evidence which indicated
that it could not be determined with certainty whether
the deceased had or had not turned his head sufficiently
far to the north to observe the approach of the defendant's truck. The contention was

m~ade

that, at the most,

the deceased was guilty of an error in judgment in
estimating that he could cross the highway safely, and
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that in addition, he was entitled to a presumption that
he used due care for his own safety. This Court, speaking through Justice Latimer, answered these contentions in the following language :
''The physical evidence and deceased's acts
and conduct were such that any presumption of
due care has been destroyed. One look to the
north at any time after deceased cleared the
east lanes would have apprised a reasonably
careful driver that the movement across the west
lanes would not ·be made in safety."
It is our contention that the same statement can be
made in answer to appellants' argument in this case.
One look to the right by the deceased, F. Parley Gibbs,
would have apprised him that he could not cross 23rd
Street in safety, and from all the evidence available
in the record, it is clear that the presumption of due
care, if it ever existed in this case, has been destroyed.
From the foregoing cases, we urge that Utah law
on the presumption of due care is as follows :
(a) a person in a place of danger is presumed
to have exercised due care for his safety, if there is no
evidence as to how the accident happened.
(b) the presumption does not extend to a presumption that he did or did not do any particular act.
(c) that where there is uncontradicted testimony
showing how the accident happened, and where that
testimony, together with the physical facts available
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and the logical inferences to be drawn from the testimony and physical facts, all point irresistibly to the
conclusion that the accident would not have happened
had the deceased used due care, the presumption is
inapplicable and cannot be considered in deciding the
issue.
Applying these principles to the facts of the instant
case, it is at once apparent that the presumption of
due care cannot be relied upon to decide this case. If
the deceased had looked to his right, at or north of the
stop sign, it is undisputed that he could have seen the
cab for at least one city block. If he was riding his
bicycle, or if he was pushing it, he still had ample opportunity to obey the law, and either wait at the stop
sign, or yield the right of way to a vehicle on a

throu~h

street. Had he done so, no accident could have, happened. It is not likely that he would have consciously
proceeded into the intersection in the path of the cab,
and it is therefore the only logical conclusion that he
did not look to the right and never saw the cab. However, whether he looked, and paid no heed, or whether
he failed to look at all, the result is the same. He was

l!!

t[

: rn

negligent in either particular, and he cannot be said
to have exercised due care. Added to these factors is
the additional omission by the deceased in failing to
have a light or lamp upon his bicycle, although required
to do so by law.
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In those cases diseussed by appellants where a
deceased entered upon a railroad track and was killed,
the Court has applied the presumption because a conflict existed as to whether or not the deceased, had he
looked, could haYe seen the train. Thus, it became a
fact question as to whether his failure to look could
have contributed to the accident. See Davis v. R. R. Co.,
supra. In the case at bar, no such conflict exists, because it is clear and certain, from this record, that the
deceased, had he looked, could have seen the cab, or,
at least, its headlights. The trial court so found after
his inspection (Tr. 87). The only way the deceased
could have failed to know about the cab was if he failed
to look. Therefore, reasonable minds cannot differ on
the statement that he could not have exercised due care.
In view of the foregoing, we submit that the presumption of due care, if it ever existed under the facts
of this case, has been effectively overcome and is not a
factor to be considered, in the light of the evidence and
inferences to be drawn therefrom.
II. THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, THAT F. PARLEY GIBBS, THE DECEASED, WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO HIS DEATH.

The appellants have discussed this phase of the
case under their Points numbered II and III. Their
approach is nothing more or less than :an attempt to
urge the Court to overrule a long line of decisions
which hold in substance that where a person enters a
through highway in the face of oncoming traffic, and
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either fails to keep a lookout for such traffic, or, looking, fails to heed what he sees, and his failure in either
regard contributes to the accident, he will be held to
have been guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law.
There are many cases decided by this Court which
are based upon these fundamental principles, and among
them are the following: Bullock v. Luke, 98 P. (2d) 350;
Conklin v. Walsh, 193 P. (2d) 437; Hickok v. Skinner,
190 P. (2d) 514; Gren v. Norton, supra.

'

(

Only one of these cases, namely, the Hickok case,
is cited in appellants' brief. We submit that these decisions correctly state the law, .and even if the Court
should desire to re-examine the principles ·announced in
these cases, the facts in the case at bar do not justify
such a re-examination.
The principles announced in these and related ·cases
indicate clearly that appellants were not entitled to
go to the jury in this case, even when the evidence
is viewed in the light most favorable to them. Gibbs
approached a through highway apparently as he had
done on many previous occasions. The intersection is
but a few doors form his hnme, and it is logical to assume that he was familiar with it. Perhaps it was this
familiarity which led to his disregard of the fundamental
rules of safety and the traffic laws of this state. In
any event, it is undisputed that for at least ten steps
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before he reached the stop sign, which is a few feet
north of the curb line, he had an unobstructed view of
the street to his right, for at least the distance of one
city block. No other traffic was on the road, and nothing
in the record indicates that any condition existed which
would confuse him or justify his inability to see the
headlights of the approaching cab. As a practical matter, he could have seen the headlights of the cab for
a distance of more than one city ·block, and the headlights
would have been clearly visible to him at any point in
which the cab might have been had he looked for it .. This
would be the fact, whether he was riding his bicycle
or walking along pushing it, or standing still at the
entrance to the intersection. As previously indicated,
however, the logical inference is that he was riding the
bicycle.
If he stopped at the stop sign and then proceeded
into the street in the path of the oncoming taxicab, he
was guilty of negligence in entering 23rd Street at a
time when another vehicle was approaching so close as
to constitute an immediate hazard. He was guilty of
this negligence whether he failed to look for the taxicab, or whether he looked and failed to heed what he
saw.
If the deceased did not stop at the intersection,
but proceeded blindly into it, he was equally guilty
of negligence in failing to keep a proper lookout and
also in failing to stop at the entrance to a through
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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highway. In addition to these failures, he compounded
his negligence by operating a bicycle on the streets of
Ogden at a time prior to 30 minutes before sunrise
without having a la:mv, on the front of the bicycle, as
required by the ordinances of the city of Ogden.
In addition to those omissions, it is quite clear
that the deceased could have avoided the .accident at
any time, had he exercised ordinary ·care, either by
stepping off the bicycle, or ·by turning the wheel, or by
braking to a stop in the distance of more than 271/2 feet
which he had to traverse in order to reach the area of
impact, as indicated on the stipulated diagram. So far
as can be determined, he did none of these things, and
took no action to avoid the accident, unless it ·can be
said that the position of the front wheel of the bicycle
as the respondent's driver turned the wheels of the
cab, indicates that Gibbs had made an effort to turn
the bicycle from a due south course to his left in order
to .avoid the area of impact.

I

~

No assertion is made by appellants, and indeed,
none could be made, that Gibbs did not have a duty of
due care as he approached the intersection. He was
governed by the same rules as a motorist, and this is so
whether he was riding his bicycle or was pushing it. As
was said by this Court in the case of Mingus v. !Olsson,
supra,
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''the rights of pedestrians to the use of the
public streets are the same as those of motorists-neither greater nor less. Hence, a pedestrian crossing a public street * * * , :although he
may have the right of way over vehicular traffic,
nonetheless has the duty to o•bserve for such
traffic.''
In view of this principle of law, we assert that Gibbs
had the same duty of care as would be required of
a motorist who entered 23rd Street from Jefferson
Avenue on the morning in question. This being so, his
conduct must be judged in the same manner as this
Court has judged the conduct of drivers who have been
involved in intersection collisions in the cases previously cited in this portion of our argument.

An examination of the cited cases makes it abundantly clear that no person can enter an intersection
such as the one involved in this case without observing
conditions to his left and to his right and thereafter
paying heed to what his observation reveals. This is
a fundamental doctrine that has been recognized by the
courts in steadily increasing numbers since the advent
of the automobile. Our examination does not reveal that
the Supreme Court of Utah has varied from these
principles down to the time of the writing of this
brief. Appellants seem to argue to the contrary, and
take comfort from a number of. decisions, the latest
of which is the case of Lowder v. Holley, (1951), 233
P. (2d) 350. The Lowder ease does not represent any
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principle different from that for which we contend.
It was a case in which the triai judge was the trier of
the fact, and the Supreme Court, in its opinion, simply
says that there was evidence upon which the trial court
could have found that the plaintiff was justified in
assuming that the defendant would exercise ordinary
care. Under the facts of the case, says the Court, plaintiff's failure to see the truck would in no way have
contributed to the accident. What this holding means,
as we view the matter, is simply this: that the plaintiff
in the Lowder case might have been negligent, but he
was not necessarily contributorily negligent, since his
negligence could not have contributed to the accident,
and the negligence of the driver of the a:pposing car was
the sole and proximate cause of the accident. The facts
in the Lowder case differ greatly from the facts in this
case, and the Lowder decision is therefore not controlling here. In the Lowder case, the evidence was clear,
and the Court found, that the driver of the defendant's
truck was speeding, which, of course, would have affected

I,

1~

the appearance of the situation at the time the plaintiff
in that case was required to look for oncoming traffic.
. Further, Lowder looked for traffic and saw none. His
view of the road was not complete. In the case at bar,
the evidence is uncontradicted that the defendant's taxicab was proceeding at a safe speed and within both the
letter and spirit of the speed ordinances. The view
of the road available to the deceased was complete and
unobstructed. The only evidence in the record as to
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speed is that of the respondent'~ driYer, which is that
he was travelling :20 to :25 miles per hour. The distance
within which he stopped the taxicab on the wet street
bears out this testin1ony. As an additional indication
of its accuracy, ''"e haYe the fact that so far as is dPtermined by the record, the deceased 1nade no accusation,
started no argun1ent, and made no protestations of innocence in the seconds immediately following the accident. It is logical to assume that had the deceased been
of the opinion that the taxicab was going at an excessive
speed and that that belief caused confusion in his mind,
he would have made some accusation to that effect. It
is equally logical, of course, that respondent's driver
would have been careful to omit such an accusation from
his recital of the facts, but there is the testimony of the
disinterested witness Tyler, who appeared on the scene
in time to hear the deceased say, "I am all right," and

who did not testify concerning any further conversation. Had there been any further conversation, particularly of an argumentative nature, Tyler no doubt would
have recalled it.
The Lowder decision represents no new doctrine,
in view of its facts, and a careful reading of the opinion
convinces us that the Court, by that decision, did not
overrule, either expressly or by implication, the wellconsidered and esta'blished decisions found in the cases
of Bullock v. Luke, Hickok v. Skinner, Conklin v. Walsh
and Gren v. Norton, supra.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24
The other cases cited by appellants in support of
the ''doctrine'' of the Lowder case likewise bear no
resemblance to the case at bar. In the case of Spackman v. Carson, (Utah, 1950), 216 P. (2d) 640, the
Court saia, at page 642, '' rrhis case stands strictly on
its own facts''. The Court then goes on to say that
the case is a close one, and it is clear from the opinion
that the case was not without difficulty. In each of the
other cases cited by appellants, and particularly in the
case of Martin v. Sheffield, 112 Utah 478, 189 P. (2d)
127, there were conflicts in the evidence which could
only be resolved by jury consideration. No such conflict appears in our case.
It is true that only in a clear case should a verdict
be directed against a plaintiff upon the ground of contributory negligence. What is usually meant by "a
clear case'' is a case in which the minds of reasonable
men could not differ on the facts rpresented. There
is no possibility in this case that the minds of reasonable men could differ as to the cause, or at least the
contributing cause, of this accident. Had Gibbs not
entered the intersection into the path of the respondent's taxicab, this accident would not have occurred.
As has been demonstrated, his entrance into the intersection under the circumstances prevailing at the time,
could only have been the result of negligence. His
negligence, therefore, started an unbroken chain of
events which led to the impact, and even if it be said
that the respondent's driver was negligent, there can
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be no doubt that Gibbs' negligence ach_'d in concert
with, and concurred with, the negligence of the cab
driver to bring about this accident. Under such circumstances, we assert it would have been error for
the trial court to deny respondent's n1otion for a directed
Yerdict, and the ruling of the trial court in granting the
motion should therefore be affirmed.
III. THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD
BE AFFIRMED, EVEN IF THE GROUNDS ASSIGNED BY
THE TRIAL COURT ARE INADEQUATE, WHERE, AS
HERE, IT APPEARS FROM THE ENTIRE RECORD THAT
A VERDICT FOR THE DEFENDANT WOULD HAVE BEEN
REQUIRED IN ANY EVENT.

The trial court, in announcing the reason for his
decision, stated that he believed that Gibbs was negligent in the particulars hereinbefore discussed, and that
the negligence of Gibbs concurred with the negligence
of the cab driver. For the purposes of the motion,
the trial court apparently assumed that the taxicab
driver was negligent, and the_ additional negligence on
the part of Gibbs in operating a bicycle without a light
was apparently not considered.
It is a familiar principle of law that if a trial
court, in directing a verdict, commits error upon the
basis of the announced grounds for his decision, the
error is harmless if the record of the trial is such that
a verdict for the defendant would be required in any
event. Sullivan v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 91 Utah
405, 64 P. (2d) 351; 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Sec.
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1849, page 1334, and cases cited therein. Therefore, if
this Court should feel some doubt as to the correctness
of the ruling of the trial court, as viewed in the light
of the reasons assigned at the time the motion for
directed verdict was gr:anted, nevertheless the ruling
of the trial court should be sustained, if upon the whole
record it appears that a verdict for the defendant
would have been required in any event.

In addition to the specifications of active negligence on the part of Gibbs, which have been discussed
in some detail herein, we find the additional negligent
omission of a light on the front of the bicycle. We
assert that a failure to have a light, as required by the
ordinance, is negligence per se. The ~purpose of the
ordinance is to protect people on the thoroughfares of
the city of Ogden, and to protect people with bicycles
during the nighttime hours. A light is required in order
that the presence of the bicycle will be revealed to the
motoring public, as well 1as to the walking public. It

I,

:~

is clear that if Gibbs had had a light on the front of
the bicycle, there would have been some indication of
the presence of the bicycle in the darkness outside
the sc01pe of the headlights of the taxicab. Obviously,
the illumination from the streetlight on the northeast
corner was insufficient to reveal the presence of ~an
unlighted bicycle in the care of a man wearing dark
clothing on a dark, misty and rainy morning. The
cab driver was observing the things and objects revealed
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by his lights. This is eYidenced by the f,aet that he
reacted instantaneously when the front wheel of the
bicycle appeared in the rone of light cast out by his
left headlight. Reasonable minds cannot differ on the
proposition that Gibbs' failure to have a light on his
bicycle was one of the f,actors which contributed to
the happening of this accident.
Although little has been said about it by counsel,
we believe it important to urge, in support of our
third point of argument, that the appellants have not
produced sufficient evidence upon which to charge the
respondent's driver with negligence which proximately
caused the accident. At best, the evidence on this point
is equally balanced, and it is just as logical to assume
that the deceased, by his various acts of negligence,
created a sudden peril, as it is to assume that the
respondent's driver \Vas guilty of negligence which led
to the accident. There is no evidence of excessive speed,
nor is there evidence of improper lookout. In fact, the
evidence in each particular is without contradiction
that the speed was not excessive and that the lookout
maintained by the driver of the cab was constant and
proper, and resulted in a prompt swerving of the
wheels, which prevented the deceased from being
crushed rather than being merely grazed, as actually
occurred.
Therefore, the ruling of the trial court should be
sustained, not only upon the grounds which were as-
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signed by the trial court at the time the ruling was made,
but upon the additional grounds of further acts of negligence on the part of the deceased and the lack ·of sufficient proof of negligence on the part of the respondent's driver. All of these grounds were asserted by
respondent in its motion for a directed verdict (Tr.
86), and when all of the grounds assigned for the
motion 1are considered, it is clear that a verdict for
the respondent was required in any event.
CONCLUSION
Although appellants devoted a considerable portion of their brief to a discussion of ·cases from other
jurisdictions bearing upon the points of argument urged
by them, we have not felt it necessary to prolong this
brief by a discussion of those cases. It is recognized
that cases can be obtained from other jurisdictions to
support almost any proposition of automobile law, in
view of the tremendous number of cases which have
been decided by the courts in the last thirty-five years.
We are of the opinion that the law in Utah is well
settled, and is adequate to serve as a precedent for
the case at bar. This Court has had occasion to pass
upon the principles of law which are involved in this
case, and we think no good purpose would be served
by urging a reconsideration of the doctrines previously
announced by this Court, if such reconsideration is to
he based upon a law of a foreign jurisdiction, some ,of
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which is controlled by legislativl' enaetment and by the
peculiar conditions which may havt> eonfronted the
courts of those states as they decided the eases prP~ented.
The facts in the case at bar ·are essentially without
dispute. The inferences to be drawn frmn the proven
facts are likewise essentially without dispute. The
principles of law which have been announced by this
Court in recent years should be reaffirmed, especially
where, as here, the facts are such that reasona•ble men
could not differ, and would be required to find that
the deceased was guilty of negligence in at least one
of the many particulars presented in details herein, and
that such negligence contributed to the cause of this
accident to such an extent that the accident would not
have occurred but for that negligence.
The action of the trial court should be sustained
and the judgment affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
SKEEN, THURMAN & WORSLEY
and JOHN H. SNOW

Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent.
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